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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SUPREME COURT 
Case No. 21049 
Category No. 6 
RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
David B. Paulsen was injured while in the employ of 
his brother. Thomas A. Paulsen, dba Thomas A. Paulsen Company 
(R. 14. 20. 71). Thomas Paulsen was uninsured for workers' 
compensation coverage at the time of injury contrary to the 
mandatory insurance provision of Section 35-1-46 (U.C.A.. 1953, 
as amended. R. 40-41, 72). He had apparently attempted to 
secure insurance for his brother, his only employee, through 
Respondents submit this summary to correct and 
supplement petitioner's "Statement of Facts" which is in some 
ways misleading and incomplete. 
THOMAS A. PAULSEN COMPANY. * 
Petitioner. * 
v. * 
* 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF * 
UTAH and THE DEFAULT * 
INDEMNITY FUND. * 
Respondents. * 
Gail Jones, an independent insurance agent, dba Rogers 
Insurance, Incorporated (R. 41). Mr. Jones "failed to properly 
order the insurance, failed to follow through to obtain a 
completed policy, and failed to forward the premium payment to 
any company...." (See the Consent Decree issued by the 
Insurance Commissioner of the State of Utah In the Matter of 
Gail Jones, Rogers Insurance, Inc., attached as Addendum "A".) 
The Findings of Fact entered by the law judge after a 
hearing before the Industrial Commission on David's application 
for workers' compensation benefits enumerated the benefits to 
which David was entitled and went on to say: "These...are the 
responsibility of the employer, since the employer was 
uninsured for workers' compensation purposes at the time of the 
industrial injury" (R. 72). The law judge also found that 
Thomas Paulsen was "in no position to pay... the...benefits due 
in this matter for the reason that for all practical purposes 
[he] is insolvent." (R. 73) 
Neither David, nor his brother, Thomas Paulsen, were 
represented by counsel at the time of the hearing (R. 71). 
Since, at the time of the hearing, petitioner was 
unable to pay the award, the Order entered by the Industrial 
Commission on January 22, 1985, directed the Default Indemnity 
Fund to pay the benefits. This Order failed to include the 
-2-
language from the Findings of Fact regarding petitioner's 
ultimate liability or any language from Section 35-1-107(3) 
(U.C.A., 1953, as amended) regarding the Default Indemnity 
Fund's right of subrogation against petitioner. 
None of the parties sought review of that Order. In 
petitioner's "Statement of Facts" he alleges that he "did not 
seek review because the Order had no effect on him." 
(Petitioner's Brief, at p. 5) As to petitioner's alleged 
motivation; there is no evidence below to support such a 
"fact", it is raised for the first time on appeal, and is 
irrelevant. That the "Order had no effect on" petitioner is 
not true. The Order, together with the Findings of Fact and 
the applicable law, created subrogation rights in the Default 
Indemnity Fund. The Fund's attempt to enforce those rights 
precipitated this appeal. 
The award of benefits, as ordered by the commission, 
was satisfied by the Fund shortly after entry of the January 
Order. 
The Default Indemnity Fund subsequently filed a motion 
on September 24, 1985, pursuant to Section 35-1-78, (U.C.A., 
1953, as amended). The motion requested the entry of a 
supplemental or amended order (R. 76). An amended order was 
necessary for two reasons: 1. A clerical error in the 
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original Order resulted in the omission of the specific finding 
of fact regarding the employer's ultimate liability; and 2. 
The total award in the January 22, 1985, Order was $21,066.73 
of which $6,804.49 represented medical bills. The Default 
Indemnity Fund, pursuant to its authority under Section 
35-1-107(7), adjusted these bills which resulted in a total 
payment by the Fund of only $21,022.72. The original Order 
needed to be amended to reflect the sum actually paid by the 
Fund. Each of these amendments were necessary before the Fund 
could, in exercising its subrogation rights, docket the award 
in the District Court pursuant to Section 35-1-59 (U.C.A., 
1953, as amended). 
The Default Indemnity Fund's motion was granted and a 
Supplemental Order was signed on October 8, 1985 (R. 77). The 
petitioner filed a Motion for Review of the Supplemental Order 
on October 23, 1985 (pp. 77-81). That Motion was denied and 
this appeal taken therefrom. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Petitioner raises two issues on appeal; 
1. Does the DefauLt Indemnity Fund have a right to 
reimbursement from an uninsured employer? and, if so, 
2. Was the procedure used by the Fund to enforce its 
rights correct? 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT 
FROM PETITIONER AS AN UNINSURED EMPLOYER. 
A. 
An employer cannot escape ultimate 
liability for workers' compensation 
benefits in a workers1 compensation case. 
An employees' right to receive, and an employer's duty 
to provide workers compensation benefits are created and 
defined by Statute. See Sections 35-1-45, 35-1-46, 35-1-52, 
35-1-56, 35-1-57, 35-1-58, 35-1-59, 35-1-60 (U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended); Martinez v. Industrial Commission of Utah, et.al., 34 
U.A.R. 32, (May 19, 1986); and cases cited therein. These laws 
are "part of several interrelated social welfare enactments..." 
and are founded on the principle "that industry should bear its 
fair share of the burdens it creates through injuries to those 
who serve in it...." United Air Transport Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission, 107 Utah 52, 151 P.2d 591; Barber Asphalt Corp. v. 
Industrial Commission, 103 Utah 371, 135 P.2d 266 cited with 
approval in Spencer v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 390 P.2d 
692 (1930) at p. 693 and Martinez, supra at p. 33. 
An "incidental, though important" element in this 
system is the requirement that all employers provide workers' 
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compensation insurance for their employees. However, even if 
it is found that an employer has a valid insurance policy 
providing workers' compensation coverage, he does not escape 
liability for claims made by his employees. Larson, Workmen* s 
Compensation Law, Desk Edition, Section 1.00 through 2.70; 
Industrial Commission v. Daley Mining Co., Utah, 172 P. 301 
(1918) at p. 304; and American Fuel Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 187 P. 633 (1920). 
The reasoning behind the above mentioned principle is 
set forth in the case of American Fuel Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 187 P. 633 (1920). The case involved an 
employer, American Fuel, which had secured coverage through 
"the Guardian Casualty & Guaranty Company, a stock corporation 
authorized to transact the business of workmens' compensation 
insurance...." American Fuel's employee was injured on July 
25, 1917. Guardian admitted liability and commenced payment of 
benefits to the employee. Guardian was subsequently placed in 
the hands of a receiver and declared insolvent. On October 29, 
1919, the Industrial Commission found that the employee was 
entitled to benefits in addition to those paid by Guardian and 
ordered that these benefits be paid by the employer. The 
employer argued that "by procuring insurance, it was relieved 
from all liability to pay compensation to its injured employee. 
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and that the sole liability to pay the compensation ordered by 
the commission revolved upon the Guardian Casualty Guaranty 
Company..." supra, at p. 633. In rejecting the employees 
argument, the Supreme Court queried: 
What is meant by the words "employers shall 
secure compensation to their employees"? Does it 
mean they shall obtain an insurance policy and 
thereby be relieved of all responsibility to the 
employees who have no voice in making the 
selection of the insurance carrier? Or does it 
not plainly appear, both from the letter and the 
spirit of the law, that the employer "shall 
secure"--make sure, make more certain—the 
payment of compensation, leaving the obligation 
still that of the employer? The primary 
obligation on the part of the employer is to pay 
compensation when awarded. Insurance is 
incidental, though important. It is necessary 
because employers sometimes fail in business and 
because payments to injured employees or their 
dependents are frequently distributed over long 
periods of time. To make more certain the prompt 
payment of these awards the insurance feature was 
provided by the law...and awards rendered against 
the employer for the payment of compensation 
under the provisions of this title. 
If the employer is relieved from liability 
when he procures his insurance, why should an 
award be rendered against him?...[Emphasis 
supplied]. 
The Court went on to hold that: 
Reading the statute as a whole, and considering 
all of its provisions, the plain and unmistakable 
import of the language of the act compels the 
conclusion that the right to compensation arises 
out of the relation existing between employer and 
employee; that compensation is a tax upon 
industry or upon the employer's business, a tax 
that is added to the price of the product and is 
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ultimately paid by the consumer; that the 
employer is primarily liable for compensation to 
the employee; that both employer and insurance 
carrier are liable for the payment of 
compensation to the injured employee; and that 
the default of either will not excuse payment by 
the other. [Emphasis supplied] 
Supra at pp. 634-635. 
It is clear that an employer does not and cannot 
escape liability in workers' compensation cases simply by 
procuring insurance. This should be no less true of an 
employer who has violated the law. It can not be said that the 
legislature intended that a complying employer be liable in the 
event his insurance carrier defaults, but a non-complying 
employer has no obligation to his employees in the event he 
2 
testifies he is temporarily unable to pay the claim. 
B, 
The existence of the Default Indemnity 
Fund does not alter or excuse an 
employer's ultimate liability under the law. 
The Default Indemnity Fund was created by the 
legislature in 1984 in response to the insolvency of a 
certified self-insured employer. That insolvency, which 
occurred in 1983, resulted in the loss of workers' 
Respondents admit that an employer's liability 
might be discharged by a court of competent jurisdiction as in 
a bankruptcy proceeding under federal law, however, that is not 
the case here. 
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compensation benefits by many injured employees. Their plight 
brought to focus a problem which had plagued the Industrial 
Commission since it was established at the turn of the century. 
An employee is often unable to resume employment after 
an injury. Outstanding medical bills can result in additional 
financial pressure. Most private health insurance policies 
specifically exclude coverage for on-the-job injuries. Health 
care providers often refuse all but emergency care when a 
patient is without insurance and unable to pay. An injured 
employee, unable to work and in need of medical care, is among 
society's most disadvantaged citizens if there are no workers1 
compensation benefits available to satisfy his ongoing 
expenses. Where his employer has no insurance, or inadequate 
insurance, the employer is ultimately responsible for workers' 
compensation benefits under the Act. When the employer is 
unable to pay because of insolvency, the injured employee must 
shoulder the entire burden of financial and physical loss. 
The purpose of the Default Indemnity Fund is to pay 
and assure workers' compensation benefits to injured workers 
when the employer, whether self-insured or uninsured, "becomes 
insolvent...or otherwise does not have sufficient funds [or] 
insurance...to cover workers' compensation liability...." 
Petitioner argues in his brief that "[t]here is 
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nothing in Section 35-1-107 which would indicate that merely 
because the Default Indemnity Fund paid an award to the 
employee, the award is the responsibility of the employer." 
Petitioner cites no facts nor legal authority in support of 
this argument. It is simply an incorrect and tortured reading 
of that Section and ignores several relevant code provisions: 
Section 35-1-45 states; 
Every employee...who is injured,...by accident 
arising out of or in the course of his 
employment,...shall be entitled to receive, and 
shall be paid, such compensation for loss 
sustained on account of such injury.... 
Section 35-1-46 provides that; 
Employers... shall secure compensation to their 
employees...by insuring, and keeping insured, the 
payment of such compensation.... [or by 
certifying as a qualified self-insured.] Any 
employer who shall fail to comply with the 
provisions of [this] section...shall be guilty of 
a misdemeanor. 
Section 35-1-58 states; 
Any employee, whose employer [is uninsured]..., 
may, in lieu of proceeding against his employer 
by civil action in the courts...file his 
application with the commission for 
compensation...and the commission shall hear and 
determine such application for compensation as in 
other cases; and the amount of compensation which 
the commission may ascertain and determine to be 
due to such injured employee...shall be paid by 
such employer.... 
Section 35-1-107(1) provides; 
There is created a Default Indemnity Fund for the 
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purpose of paying and assuring,. ..workers' 
compensation benefits [to employees] 
when...[their] employer becomes insolvent, ... or 
otherwise does not have sufficient funds...to 
cover workers* compensation liabilities under 
this chapter. 
Section 35-1-107(3) provides; 
To the extent of the compensation and other 
benefits paid or payable to an employee...from 
the Default Indemnity Fund, the Fund, by 
subrogation, has all the rights, powers, and 
benefits of the employee...against the employer 
failing to make the compensation payments. 
[Emphasis supplied.] 
Petitioner's argument that there is nothing in Section 
35-1-107 which would indicate that the award is the 
responsibility of the employer also ignores this Court's 
holding in American Fuel, supra. In interpreting Section 3134 
(comp. Laws Utah 1917, now Section 35-1-58) this court observed 
that the legislature used "the words 'compensation...from an 
employer' - not from the insurance carrier..." thus intending 
that the employer be ultimately liable, not the insurance 
carrier. (supra, at p. 635) Had the legislature intended that 
an uninsured employer escape liability for payment of benefits 
to his employees when it created the Default Indemnity Fund, 
Section 35-1-58 should have been amended to read: "Any 
employee, whose employer [is uninsured]..., shall be paid by 
the Default Indemnity Fund." 
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Additionally, Section 35-1- 107(1) is rendered 
nonsensical under petitioner's analysis. That subsection 
provides that the Default Indemnity Fund shall pay and assure 
compensation benefits to employees. Assure means "to make 
3 
safe...sure or certain: insure" and applies here to 
employees who are entitled to compensation benefits. 
Petitioner's analysis might have been correct had that section 
provided that the Default Indemnity Fund assure employers who 
are found liable for compensation benefits. Of course, such a 
provision would have, in effect, abolished mandatory insurance 
by eliminating employer liability altogether. 
Here, petitioner attempted to obtain workers' 
compensation insurance for his brother on February 23, 1984. 
(R. 41.) The injury occurred on April 1, 1984. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that David was employed throughout that 
period of time, and that petitioner did not have insurance 
during that same period. Section 35-1-46 provides that 
petitioner is thus guilty of 36 separate Class B Misdemeanors 
subject to a minimum fine of $10.00 each or a jail sentence of 
3Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 
Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster Inc., 1985, p.110. 
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30 days each. That the legislature saw fit to punish 
non-compliance in this case, had petitioner been charged and 
convicted, with up to 3 years in jail, can only be interpreted 
to mean that the legislature intended non-compliance to carry a 
significant punishment. To argue that the legislature 
subsequently passed legislation requiring the Default Indemnity 
Fund to indemnify that same non-complying employer and relieve 
him of his financial obligation to his employee interprets 
Section 35-1-107 in a manner which ignores and makes a mockery 
of 80 years of workers1 compensation law. 
Finally, the Findings of Fact entered on January 22, 
1985, state that while the employer made "good faith...efforts 
to obtain workers* compensation coverage," he "was 
uninsured...at the time of the industrial injury." Had the 
employer disagreed with this finding, he should have filed a 
Motion for Review within fifteen days of the entry of those 
findings. Since he did not, he is forever barred. Petitioner 
cannot re-open and re-litigate the question of liability before 
the commission. 
C. 
The Default Indemnity Fund is 
entitled to reimbursement from 
a non-complying employer. 
Petitioner argues that because Section 35-1-107(3) 
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does not specifically state that the Industrial Commission can 
direct that an employer reimburse the Default Indemnity Fund, 
the October 8, 1985, Order exceeds the powers of the commission. 
Respondents agree that an administrative body "can 
only exercise those powers which are conferred upon it by 
statute", however, petitioner's argument tortures the meaning 
of the words "conferred ... by statute." 
The Industrial Commission, as an administrative body, 
is not vested with the power to interpret, construe, reform, 
apply or make new contracts of insurance in workers' 
compensation cases, see: Continental Casualty Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, Utah, 210 P. 127, (1922), and Empry v. 
Industrial Commission, Utah, 63 P. 2d 630, (1937). Had the law 
judge in this case made a finding against Gail Jones or Rogers 
Insurance Company on the basis of contract law, (that Jones had 
agreed to secure coverage for petitioner) such a finding would 
have clearly been beyond the statutory authority of the 
Industrial Commission. By that same reasoning, the Industrial 
Commission was clearly without authority to find that the 
employer was not liable for benefits. 
Petitioner argues that the Industrial Commission is 
not authorized to order petitioner to reimburse the Default 
Indemnity Fund because "the law judge felt the employer to be 
-14-
liable only if other sources of funds were not available. 
Because there were no personal funds available from Paulsen and 
because there were funds available from the Default Indemnity 
Fund, the Judge concluded the the employer was not liable." 
Petitioner cites no facts in support of this argument; but, 
were there facts to support such a "feeling" on the part of the 
law judge, a finding or order to that effect would have 
certainly been beyond the authority of the Industrial 
Commission. 
This argument also ignores the Fund's subrogation 
rights and Section 35-1-107(8) which provides: 
For the purpose of maintaining this fund, the 
commission, upon rendering a decision with 
respect to any claim from the Default 
Indemnity Fund for compensation under this 
chapter, shall impose a penalty against the 
employer of 15% of the total award made in the 
claim and shall direct that the additional 
penalty be paid into the fund. Awards may be 
docketed as other awards under this chapter. 
This subsection, when read together with Section 
35-1-107 (1) and (3) makes it clear that the legislature did 
not intend that an employer escape liability by the creation of 
the fund and, in fact, provided for additional penalties 
against an employer in the event the Fund was required to 
advance payment for compensation benefits. 
Petitioner would have this Court believe that while 
the Industrial Commission clearly has the authority to order an 
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employer to pay benefits directly to his employee, the 
Commission lacks authority to order the employer to reimburse 
the Default Indemnity Fund for payment of those same benefits. 
Petitioner does not discuss how his argument squares with the 
Fund's subrogation rights. Since the Fund has all of the 
rights of an employee pursuant to subrogation and the employee 
has elected to enforce his rights in the Industrial Commission 
("in lieu" of in the civil courts), the Industrial Commission's 
authority to order the employer to reimburse the Fund pursuant 
to subrogation is identical to the Commission's authority to 
order the employer to pay the employee directly. Without such 
authority on the part of the Industrial Commission, how would 
the Default Indemnity Fund enforce its subrogation rights? 
Since the employee has elected to proceed before the Industrial 
Commission, the Fund could not pursue an action in the civil 
courts. The Fund must, in following the employee's rights, 
pursue and perfect its cause before the Industrial Commission. 
Petitioner is not without a remedy in this case. The 
investigation conducted by the Insurance Department for the 
State of Utah and petitioner's statements at the time of the 
hearing in this matter reveal that petitioner requested that 
Mr. Jones of Rogers Insurance secure workers' compensation 
coverage for his employee. Mr. Jones sent a memo to the 
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American Home Insurance Company on February 23, 1984, which 
purported to place an order for that coverage. On March 8, 
1984, Mr. Jones received a letter from American Home stating 
that the company did not write workers' compensation coverage 
and could not insure petitioner. Mr. Jones apparently did not 
notify petitioner of this and claims to have requested coverage 
with a different carrier. This second carrier denied that it 
had had any communication with Jones or Rogers Insurance 
regarding petitioner's request for coverage. 
Inasmuch as petitioner is ultimately liable for the 
benefits awarded in this case, his appropriate remedy lies in a 
cause of action seeking reimbursement from Jones. Rogers 
Insurance, American Home Insurance and/or the "second 
carrier". That cause of action could only be brought by the 
petitioner and could only be heard in the District Court, not 
4 . . . 
the Industrial Commission. The Industrial Commission 
clearly lacks jurisdiction to determine liability posed by the 
facts in respect to insurance coverage. These and related 
questions are appropriately answered in a judicial forum. 
POINT II 
THE MOTION OF THE DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND AND 
THE RESULTING ORDER OF OCTOBER 8. 198 5, 
WERE PROCEDURALLY CORRECT. 
4The employee, and thus the Fund by subrogation, has 
no cause of action against these people or entities as the 
contract to provide insurance, if one in fact existed, existed 
between petitioner and/or Jones etc. 
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A. 
The Default Indemnity's Motion was made to correct 
a clerical error contained in the January 22, 
1985, Order. 
The procedure by which an employee, or the Fund when 
exercising its subrogation rights, enforces these rights 
against an uninsured employer is set forth in Section 35-1-59 
(U.C.A., 1953, as amended). An abstract of the commission's 
award is docketed in the district court and may be enforced as 
if it were a judgment of the district court. 
The Order issued in this case on January 22, 1985, 
ordered that the Fund pay the benefits. An abstract of this 
Order would have been useless against the employer. In 
reviewing the Findings of Fact entered in conjunction with that 
Order, it is clear that the law judge had omitted language from 
the Order regarding the employer's ultimate liability. Since 
this was a clerical error, the Default Indemnity Fund made a 
motion to amend the Order so that it correctly reflected the 
Findings of Fact, the express intent of the law judge and the 
law applicable to this case. That motion was granted pursuant 
to the Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction under 
Section 35-1-78. 
Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides as follows: 
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(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in 
judgments, orders or other parts of the record 
and errors therein arising from oversight or 
omission may be corrected by the court at any 
time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the 
court orders. 
U.R.C.P., 1953, as amended. 
This Court has consistently held that a Rule 60(a) 
motion is the only proper remedy in facts such as are presented 
in this case. Here, the law judge set forth in unambiguous 
language the liability of the petitioner. After enumerating 
the expenses incurred by the employee as a result of the 
injury, the finding was that "[t]these expenses are the 
responsibility of the employer...." Because of the employer's 
then present inability to pay this obligation, the law judge 
found that the employee was entitled to an award from the 
Default Indemnity Fund. The Order which was based upon those 
findings inadvertently failed to reflect either the Fund's 
subrogation rights as against the employer or the employer's 
ultimate responsibility for payment of the benefits. Inasmuch 
as the Order did not reflect, and was thus not supported by the 
findings, the Order is fatally defective. Where the defect is 
"apparent on the face of the record," it can and must be 
corrected either by motion of counsel or sua sponte. In Re 
Evans et al., Utah, 282 P. 217 (1913). 
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In Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Insurance Co., Utah, 
669 P.2d 1201 (1983), this Court noted that the jury verdict 
and the resulting judgment contained an error in addition. In 
remanding the case for correction of this error, the court held 
that: 
Under Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the trial court may correct clerical 
mistakes in judgments at any time. In 
explanation of the intent of the identical 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, the comment has 
been made that "in this broad approach to 
correctability under Rule 60(a), it matters 
little whether an error was made by the court 
clerk, the jury foreman, counsel, a party, or the 
judge himself, so long as it is clearly a formal 
error that should be corrected in the interest of 
having judgment, order, or other part of the 
record reflect what was done or intended. The 
definition of "clerical mistake" thus extends to 
include the one here discovered. It is a type of 
mistake or omission mechanical in nature which is 
apparent on the record and which does not involve 
a legal decision or judgment by an attorney. 
[Emphasis supplied] 
Citations omitted Stanger, supra, at p. 1206. 
A Rule 60(a) motion, is also proper when the mistake 
involves more than a mere error in addition. In Dairy 
Distributors, Inc. v. Local Union 976, Utah, 396 P.2d 47 
(1964), the clerk, "[i]n entering the judgment on the 
verdict,...did not fill in the blanks provided for 
interest...." A Rule 60(a) motion was made more than six years 
after entry of the judgment and was granted by the trial 
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court. In upholding the granting of that motion, this Court 
stated: 
We have no doubt about the correctness of the 
general rule that when a judgment has become 
final, the court is without authority to change 
it. Howeverf...[this does] not apply to 
situations such as the instant one, where there 
was merely a correction of an inadvertent 
omission.... The trial court in no way 
transgressed its authority in filling in the 
omission and making the record show what was true 
under the law anyway. Its action was in 
conformity with the well-established precept that 
mere lapse of time will not prevent the court 
from correcting errors or omissions.... It is 
recognized that clerical errors may be corrected 
or omissions supplied so the record will 
accurately reflect that which in fact took 
place. [Emphasis supplied] 
Citations omitted Dairy, supra, at p. 48. 
More directly on point are those cases upholding 60(a) 
motions used to amend judgments which fail to correctly reflect 
the findings of fact and/or conclusions of law previously 
entered by the court. In Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., et al, 
Utah, 579 P.2d 917 (1978), a quiet title action, the 
conclusions of law granted "to the plaintiffs possession of the 
property and quieting title in the said plaintiffs to the 
property.... The Decree however failed to incorporate the 
provision of the Conclusions of Law pertaining to the quieting 
of title...." Although that Decree had previously been 
affirmed by the Supreme Court, a 60(a) motion to amend was 
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granted. In upholding the amendment, it was noted that: 
The fact that this Court had in the interim 
affirmed the erroneous decree is of no 
consequence.... The trial court may correct 
clerical mistakes in judgments at any time. Our 
decision here must turn upon whether or not the 
alleged error in the 1974 Decree was clerical in 
nature. This Court has previously discussed the 
distinction between a judicial error and a 
clerical error...[and has made] the following 
observation: The distinction...depends on 
whether it [the error] was made in rendering the 
judgment or in recording the judgment as 
rendered. Whether the substantive rights of the 
respective parties are affected is not 
determinative. [emphasis supplied] 
Citations omitted, Bagnall, supra, at p. 918. 
Petitioner in the case argues that the law judge, by 
his October 8, 1985, Order, "'sought to review a final award of 
the Commission." The "final award" referred to is the January 
22, 1985, Order which was signed by the law judge and was not 
in fact reviewed by the Commission, no motion for review having 
been filed. Bagnall, supra, is dispositive of this alleged 
error. Even had the Industrial Commission, and this Court, 
reviewed and affirmed the January 22, 1985, Order, the 
subsequent correction of the clerical error would have been 
proper. 
In Smith v. Smith, Utah, 251 P.2d 720 (1952), the 
California Court of Appeal upheld an Order which amended and 
corrected the "Journal Entry of Judgment and Decree of 
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Divorce". The findings portion of the "Journal Entry" stated: 
"the defendant shall deliver 'certain property to plaintiff in 
conformance with the property settlement agreement previously 
entered into by the parties.1" The Decree, however, merely 
approved the property settlement without making any awards or 
orders with respect thereto. After the time for appeal had 
expired, plaintiff made a motion to correct this clerical error 
which was granted. The resulting amended Decree ordered that 
the "parties perform the property settlement agreement" and 
ordered the defendant to transfer the disputed property to the 
plaintiff. The defendant appealed and argued that the amended 
order "made a substantive change and corrected a judicial error 
rather than a clerical error." In upholding the Amended Order, 
the Court noted that: 
"Clerical" errors are, generally speaking, those 
errors, mistakes, or omissions which are not the 
result of the judicial function. Mistakes of the 
court are not necessarily judicial errors. The 
distinction between a "clerical" error and a 
"judicial" one does not depend so much upon the 
person making the error as upon whether it was 
the deliberate result of judicial reasoning and 
determination.... In line with the general rule, 
it is settled that a court, on motion of an 
interested party or on its own motion, may, at 
any time, correct or amend by a nunc pro tunc 
order any clerical error so as to make the record 
speak the truth and show the judgment which was 
actually rendered by the court. The function of 
a nunc pro tunc order is merely to correct the 
record of the judgment and not to alter the 
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judgment actually rendered — not to make an order 
now for then, but to enter now for then an order 
previously made. The question presented to the 
court on a hearing of a motion for a nunc pro 
tunc order is: What order was in fact made at 
the time by the trial judge? What transpired 
when the judgment was announced is a guestion of 
fact; and where the findings thereon are 
supported by substantial evidence, they are 
conclusive. [Emphasis supplied] 
Citations omitted Smith, supra, at p. 724. 
In the Colorado case of Reasoner v. District Court In 
And For Water Division, Colo., 594 P.2d 1060 (1979), the trial 
court issued its oral findings and order from the bench at the 
conclusion of the trial and directed counsel for plaintiff to 
prepare the written decree. The decree was signed but not 
mailed to defendant until after the time for appeal had run. 
Defendant then made a motion for "clarification" and upon 
receipt thereof, the trial court sua sponte amended the written 
decree. In upholding the amendment, the court noted that: 
This case is an example of precisely the type of 
error that...Rule 60(a), is designed to remedy. 
By allowing the court to amend the...decree to 
accurately reflect the oral findings and order, 
the amended decree speaks the truth of the 
court1s intent. It does no damage to the 
respective interests of the parties, but rather 
it fulfills their expectations as to what the 
decree was intended to say. The rule thus 
provides a safety valve by which courts can avoid 
the stubborn enforcement of an honestly mistaken 
judgment. [Emphasis supplied] 
Citation omitted Reasoner, supra, at p. 1061. 
-24-
The Supreme Court of Wyoming, in the case of In the 
Matter of Estate of Kimball. Wyo.. 583 P.2d 1274 (1978) 
explained the reasoning behind this rule. In that case, the 
trial court issued its decree in 1949 which expressly provided 
that the property of the estate be "distributed in accordance 
with the terms of the Last Will and Testament of the deceased" 
and enumerated most of the terms of the will. The decree 
omitted, however, the condition that the devisee survive Anne 
Kimball, the wife of the deceased, a condition expressly 
intended in the will. The devisee died in 1972 and in 1974 a 
motion was made to correct the decree. In upholding the 
amended order, the Wyoming court noted that the decree 
"demonstrably contains a complete contradiction in its 
terms...." The trial court's express intent, to distribute the 
property "in accordance with the terms of the" will, was not 
reflected in the decree. Since there is no question as to the 
court's intent, the amended order was not only proper but 
necessary to remove any uncertainty in the final decree. 
In the case at bar, the motion of the Default 
Indemnity Fund was made to correct the judgment to reflect the 
5 
unambiguous language of the Findings as well as the law. 
bThat the amended or Supplemental Order of October 
8, 1985, "speaks the truth of the court's intent" finds further 
support in the fact that the same law judge entered both orders 
in this case. 
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The petitioner argues, however, that the Fund's only remedy was 
to appeal. That is not correct. "An appeal is not the proper 
procedural remedy to correct such errors..." since clerical 
errors can be appropriately remedied by a Rule 60(a) motion to 
the trial court. W. F. Construction Company v. Kalik, Idaho, 
652 P.2d 661 (1982) . 
B. 
The Industrial Commission has the authority to 
grant a Rule 60(a) type 
motion pursuant to its 
continuing power and jurisdiction in 
workers' compensation cases. 
While it is clear that the Default Indemnity Fund's 
motion and the resulting Order of October 8, 1985, were proper 
under the rules of civil procedure, it might be said that since 
this is an administrative proceeding, a Rule 60(a) type motion 
does not lie. That would leave the Fund with no remedy in this 
case, and in future cases, a cumbersome, expensive and time 
consuming remedy. For if an administrative body cannot correct 
its obvious mistakes through a simple Rule 60(a) type motion 
and order, an aggrieved party might be forced to appeal to the 
Supreme Court. And, if the error was not detected within the 
appeal time, there would be no remedy. It cannot be said that 
the legislature intended such a harsh outcome in workers' 
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compensation cases. In reading Section 35-1-88 (U.C.A., 1953, 
as amended), the legislative intent seems clear: the 
Industrial Commission shall develop a procedure whereby it is 
not bound by: 
the usual common law or statutory rules of 
evidence, or by any technical or formal rules of 
procedure...as in [the commission's] judgment is 
best calculated to ascertain the substantial 
rights of the parties and to carry out justly the 
spirit of the workmen's compensation act. 
Such was the holding in Callihan v. Department of 
Labor and Industries, Wash., 516 P.2d 1073 (1973). In that 
case, the employee in a workers' compensation case sustained an 
injury to her right arm. She was awarded benefits as prayed in 
an administrative order which incorrectly referred to the 
injury as having been sustained to her left arm. 
Ms. Callihan "accepted the compensation award and took 
no appeal from the [Department of Labor & Industries] order. 
[The Supreme Court assumed she] did so in good faith believing 
the erroneous reference to the left arm was a pure 
inadvertence." 
Six months later Ms. Callihan filed a motion to 
re-open her case because her condition had worsened. Her 
motion was denied by the department and she appealed to the 
Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals claiming that the error 
-27-
(left arm instead of right arm) could not be corrected and that 
she was entitled to a second and separate award for her right 
arm. 
The board noted that the clerical error was not 
necessarily apparent on the face of the department's order and 
ordered that a hearing be held before the board on the clerical 
error issue. Ms. Callihan appealed the board's Order to the 
Supreme Court on the grounds that neither the department nor 
the board, in an administrative proceeding, could correct a 
clerical error. The Supreme Court of Washington, in rejecting 
this argument, noted that: 
Inadvertent clerical errors creep into both 
administrative and judicial proceedings. The 
manner of handling clerical errors in judicial 
proceedings is clear. An appellate court may 
itself correct a clerical error in a judgment 
appealed from without remanding the judgment to 
the trial court for that purpose. A court has 
inherent power to correct a clerical error in 
order to make the true action of the court 
conform to the record. In judicial proceedings, 
rules exist to insure that substance shall not 
give way to form, e.g., CR 60. Thus, a clerical 
error can be corrected without reformation.... 
In the instant case the board has inherent power 
to...determine whether a description contained in 
the order with reference to the injury for which 
an award is made is an inadvertent misdescription 
correctable by it. Were the rule otherwise, the 
board would be required to treat a clerical error 
as if it were no error at all. This would give 
an injured plaintiff an opportunity for 
repetitive determination on the merits of his 
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claim instead of only one to which all injured 
workmen are entitled....[Emphasis supplied] 
Cailihan, supra, at p. 1076. 
In the case before the bar, the error was obvious on 
the face of the pleadings: the Order failed to incorporate the 
Findings of Fact relative to the ultimate liability of 
petitioner. To argue that an appeal is the only remedy 
available to correct clerical errors in a workers' compensation 
case would defeat the purpose of adjudicating workers' 
compensation cases in an administrative setting where 
"non-technical rules are to apply...and... fairness is the 
guiding principle." Gardner v. Gardner Plumbing & Heating 
Inc., Utah, 693 P. 2d 678, (1984). 
In order to insure fairness and "carry out justly the 
spirit of the workmen's compensation act," the legislature 
granted the Industrial Commission continuing jurisdiction. 
Section 35-1-78 provides that: 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission 
over each case shall be continuing, and it may 
from time to time make such modification or 
change with respect to former findings, or orders 
with respect thereto, as in its opinion may be 
justified... 
This section is most often invoked in recognition of 
the fact that "industrial injuries are such that their full 
extent cannot always be diagnosed with accuracy nor their 
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consequences predicted with complete certainty." Spencer v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah. Utah, 290 P.2d 692 (1930) at p. 
694. But this is not the only appropriate application for 
Section 35-1-78 motions. 
[T]he power of the Industrial Commission as to 
its continuing jurisdiction is not limited to 
consideration of changes in [the] physical 
condition of workmen, but is extended to [the] 
right to rescind, alter, or amend orders, 
decisions, or awards [when there is] good cause 
appearing therefor. 
Bartlett Hayward Co. v. Industrial Accident 
Commission, 203 Cal. 522. 265 P. 195, cited with 
approval in Carter v. Industrial Commission. Utah, 290 
P. 776 (1920), at p. 779. 
In granting the Default Indemnity Fund's motion in 
this case, the Industrial Commission amended its Order based on 
good cause. To adopt the petitioner's argument and hold that 
an administrative body cannot correct clerical errors unless 
those errors are discovered before the time for appeal has 
expired, would be to say that an administrative body must 
"treat a clerical error as if it were no error at all." This 
position flies in the face of the philosophy behind 
administrative law. Can it be said that an error in addition 
contained in an award of benefits in a workers' compensation 
case could not be corrected? Can it be said that Ms. Callihan 
could collect a duplicate award for the injury to her right 
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arm? No, it cannot. The Industrial Commission corrects its 
clerical errors the same way a court does, with the exception 
that the amended or supplemental order is granted pursuant to 
Section 35-1-78 and not Rule 60(a). 
C. 
The January 22, 1985, Order was an 
interlocutory order only, which did 
not start the time running for the 
filing of a motion for review. 
In Lantham Co. v. the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
29 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (March 7, 1986), this Court was presented 
with a similar fact situation. There the employee had suffered 
"a prior eye injury in an industrial accident in Idaho1' and the 
Utah employer "sought to shift part of its liability to the 
Second Injury Fund. On July 13, 1983, the law judge ordered an 
apportionment of [the employee's] compensation benefits between 
State Insurance and the Second Injury Fund. The actual 
apportionment, however, was deferred until the ultimate 
impairment was established. ,f (supra, at p. 46) The law judge 
then entered an amended order on August 17, 1983, which "fixed 
the final allocation of liability between the Fund and State 
Insurance" and the Fund appealed. 
In finding that the Fund's appeal was timely, this 
court held that: 
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A law judge's order that only states 
generally that liability shall be apportioned 
between the insurance carrier and the Second 
Injury Fund, without specifying the percentages 
for which each shall be liable, is an 
interlocutory order only and does not start the 
time running for the filing of a motion for 
review. The Fund's motion for review was filed 
within fifteen days of the August 17, 1983 
order. That was the order which established the 
percentage of liability attributable to the Fund 
and to State Insurance. Therefore, the Fund's 
motion for review was timely filed. 
Lantham, supra, at pp. 46-47. 
In this case, the Order of January 22, 1985, found 
that: (1) the employee was entitled to benefits; (2) the 
employer was liable for those benefits; (3) that the employer 
was "in no position to pay [the] benefits due in this matter 
for the reason that for all practical purposes the employer is 
insolvent..." and therefore; (4) the "employee is entitled to 
an award from the Default Indemnity Fund." (R. pp. 72-73) 
That Order was final only as to the employee's 
entitlement to benefits and the petitioner's then existing 
inability to pay. As to the Fund's subrogation rights, the 
Order was silent and thus interlocutory in nature, reserving 
that issue to a later date in the event the petitioner's 
financial ability improved. The law judge did not, in part 
because he could not, order that petitioner escaped liability 
altogether. The law judge did not, because he could not, order 
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that the Fund's subrogation rights were abolished. The law 
judge did not. because he could not. order that the petitioner 
was "liable only if other sources of funds were not 
available." That would have been a clear abuse of discretion 
defeating the spirit, letter and intention of the mandatory 
insurance provisions of the law. 
SUMMARY 
Petitioner failed to raise any issue of merit in his 
Writ of Review. The Industrial Commission acted within its 
jurisdiction and authority in granting the Default Indemnity 
Fund's motion and should be affirmed. 
A7 <—' Respectfully submitted this / / day of June. 1986. 
Suzan Pixton 
Attorney for Respondents 
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I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on 
the ,u day of June, 1986, I mailed, postage prepaid, (4) 
true and correct copies of the foregoing Respondents' Brief to: 
Brad L. Englund 
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ADDENDUM A 
A-1 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORMAN H.BANGERTER I NSU R ANCE D EPARTM ENT HAROLD C. YANCEY 
_ Insurance Commissioner 
Governof
 160 East 300 South 
P O. Box 45803 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Phone: (801) 530-6400 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED THAT THE ANNEXED: 
CONSENT DECREE, DOCKET NO. 85-3, IN THE MATTER OF 
GAIL JONES AND ROGERS INSURANCE, INC. 
HAS BEEN COMPARED WITH THE ORIGINAL ON FILE IN THIS DEPARTMENT AND THAT 
IT IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT THEREFROM AND OF THE WHOLE OF SAID ORIGINAL. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my 
hand and affix the official seal of this 
Department at Salt Lake City, Utah, 
this 5th day of February 19 86 . 
HAROLD C. YANCEY, CPCU 
Insurance Commissioner 
Z/()AJ}-K^U 
inmissioner 
BEFORE THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH:5sH,,,; 
IN THE MATTER OF 
GAIL JONES, 
ROGERS INSURANCE, INC., 
RESPONDENT 
"Will - £: 
CONSENT DECREE 
File Nos. 17802, 17803 and 17841 
Docket No. 85-3 [_ 
STIPULATION AND CONSENT TO ORDER 
1. Respondent, Gail Jones, is a licensed Utah insurance 
agent, holding insurance license number 31345- Rogers Insurance. 
Inc., is a licensed insurance organization, holding insurance 
license number 01718. Respondent admits the jurisdiction of the 
State of Utah Insurance Department as to all matters herein. 
2. Respondent waives his right to be served with a Notice of 
Hearing and Order to Show Cause regarding this matter and 
stipulates with the Department as follows: 
a. That if a hearing were held herein, witnesses called 
by the Department could offer testimony and introduce credible 
evidence which would support the Findings of Fact herein; 
b. Respondent admits the accuracy of the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions made therefrom; 
c. Respondent stipulates to the summary entry of the 
Order herein which shall be in lieu of other Departmental 
proceedings in this matter; and 
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d. That Respondent shall comply with all the terms of 
the Order issued herein. 
3. Respondent is aware of his right to a hearing at which he 
may be represented by counsel, present evidence and cross-examine 
witnesses. Respondent has irrevocably waived his right to such 
public hearing and to any court appeals relating thereto. 
4. Respondent is acting voluntarily herein, free from duress 
or coercion o£ any kind or nature. 
DATED this 3 ^ 'day of ^J{JLSKJUISU 19 &\ 
Gail Jones, £J 
Respondent 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In the matter of Thomas A. Paulson Company, Respondent 
received a premium payment of $102 on May 17, 1984 for workmens 
compensation insurance. Respondent failed to properly order the 
insurance, failed to follow through to obtain a completed policy, 
and failed to forward the premium payment to any company, and has 
also failed to refund the premium to Mr. Thomas A. Paulson. 
Respondent ignored and failed to respond to the Insurance 
Department letter inquiry dated August 1, 1984. 
2. In the matter of Ms. Jeaneane M. Crannert, Respondent 
received an order for automobile insurance in behalf of Bob 
Blackley of C^mperworId. Respondent intended to place the 
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insurance with Aid Insurance Company; however. Respondent failed 
to order the insurance and failed to forward any premium to Aid 
Insurance Company. In approximately October. 1983 Mr. Blackley's 
car was involved in a third party property damage accident with 
Ms. Crannert. Respondent was furnished* repair estimates from Ms. 
Crannert in accordance with instructions she received from 
Respondent's agency. Respondent failed to respond to Ms. Crannert 
or to her attorney, and failed to explain the lack of insurance' 
coverage to Mr. Blackley.* Respondent ignored and failed to 
respond to the Insurance Department letter inquiry dated May 30, 
1984 and the follow-up letter dated June 29. 1984. Respondent was 
finally contacted by telephone on August 30. 1984 by the market 
conduct examiner in the Insurance Department. On September 10. 
1984. about a year after the accident. Respondent issued a check 
for $238.41 payable to Ms. Jeaneane Crannert. 
3. In the matter of Elizabeth M. Lykins. Respondent failed 
to respond to the letter inquiry dated March 9. 1984 from the 
Insurance Department regarding the insurance coverage question for 
Ms. Lykins. 
CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER 
1. Respondent's failure to properly order workmens 
compensation insurance and deliver a policy to Thomas A. Paulson 
Company, failure to forward the premium payment to an insurer or 
return the premium to Mr. Thomas, and ignoring and failing to 
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respond to the Insurance Department inquiry letter dated August 1. 
1984, in violation of sections 31-17-22(3), 31-19-24 and 31-27-19, 
U-C.A., constitute sufficient cause for the commissioner to 
revoke, suspend or refuse' to renew Respondent's insurance license, 
and the organization insurance license of Rogers Insurance, Inc., 
or impose a fine upon Respondents of up to $1,500, pursuant to 
Sections 31-2-3(3), 31-17-9(4), 31-17-50(2)(4)(5)&(8), and 
31-17-50.5, U.C.A. 
2. Respondent's failure to order automobile insurance for 
Bob Blackley, leading both Mr. Blackley and Ms. Crannert to 
believe there was insurance coverage in force, failure to respond 
to Ms. Crannert regarding her property damage liability claim for 
more than ten months, failure to respond to the Insurance 
Department inquiry letter dated May 30, 1984, and acting as an 
adjuster and unauthorized seFf-insurer by issuing a check 
September 10, 1984 for $238.41 payable to Jeaneane Crannert to 
cover her property damage liability claim in violation of Sections 
31-17-5, 31-27-19, and 31-38-3, U.C.A., constitute sufficient 
cause for the commissioner to revoke, suspend or refuse to renew 
Respondent's insurance license, and the organization insurance 
license of Rogers Insurance, Inc., or impose a fine upon 
Respondent of up to $1,500, pursuant to Sections 31-17-9(4). 
31-17-50(2) . (5)&(8) , and 31-17-50.*5, U.C.A. or impose a fine upon 
Respondents up to $10,000 pursuant to Section 31-8-8, U.C.A. 
3. Respondent's failure to respond to tha Insurance 
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sufficient cause for the commissioner to revoke, suspend or refuse 
to renew Respondent's insurance license and the organization 
license of Rogers.Insurance, Inc. or impose a fine upon Respondent 
of up to $1,500, pursuant to Sections 31-2-3(3), 31-17-50(2)&(8), 
and 31-17-50.5. U.C.A. 
4. That as a consequence of said violations and pursuant to 
Sections 31-17-50 and 31-17-50.5, U.C.A., it is hereby: 
a. That Respondent shall pay a fine of $250 to the Utah 
State Insurance Department. The fine shall be fully paid within 
thirty (30) days from the'date of this Order. If not paid when 
due, the Respondent's insurance agent's license shall be revoked 
without further notice. 
b. That this Order "is made in lieu of other Departmental 
proceedings relating to the matter herein set forth. 
DONE AND ORDERED this V '^~~ day of <?.<'?<U/''-^** , 19 8_2T 
/ 
ROGER C. DAY 
Commissioner of'-Insurance 
Jef f/ Gabardi 
.Deputy Commissioner 
(state of Utah Insurance Department 
160 East 300 South, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 45803 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
(801)530-6400 
0470J 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on the day of January, 
1985, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing executed 
Consent Decree. Docket No. 85-3, to Mr. Gail Jones, Rogers 
Insurance. Inc., P.O. Box 725, Provo, Utah 84603-0725, postage 
pre-paid. 
- XflLlJL dJ kAUjd) 
Julie Anderson 
Secretary to Commissioner Day 
ADDENDUM B 
A-2 
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to 
be paid. 
Every employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 
who is injured, and the dependents of every such 
employee who is killed, by accident arising out of 
or in the course of his employment, wherever such 
injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely 
self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss 
sustained on account of the injury or death, and 
such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital 
services and medicines, and, in case of death, such 
amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this 
chapter. The responsibility for compensation and 
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services 
and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under 
this chapter shall be on the employer and its 
insurance carrier and not on the employee. l** 
35-1-52. Agreements in lieu of compensation and 
benefits. 
Subject to the approval of the commission, any 
employer may enter into or continue any agreement 
with his employees to provide a system of compen-
sation or other benefits in lieu of the compensation 
and other benefits provided by this title. No such 
substitute system shall be approved unless it confers 
benefits upon injured employees and their depende-
nts at least equivalent to the compensation provided 
by this title, nor if it requires contributions from 
the employees, unless it confers benefits in addition 
to those provided under this title at least commens-
urate with such contributions. Such substitute 
system may be terminated by the commission, after 
a hearing on reasonable notice to the interested 
parties, if it shall appear that the same is not fairly 
administered, or if its operation shall disclose 
defects threatening its solvency, or if for any subst-
antial reason it fails to accomplish the purposes of 
this title; and in such case the commission shall 
determine the proper distribution of all remaining 
assets, if any Any employer who makes a 
deduction for such purposes from the wages or 
salary of any r-npioyee emitled to the benefit of this 
title is guilty of a misdemeanor; provided, that 
subject to the supervision of the commission, 
nothing in this title shall be construed as preventing 
the employer and his employees from entering, and 
it shall be lawful for them to enter into mutual 
contracts and agreements respecting hospital 
benefits and accommodations and medical and 
surgical services, nursing and medicines to be 
furnished the employees as in this title provided, if 
no profit, directly or indirectly, is made by any 
employer as a result of such contract or agreement; 
the purpose and intent of this section being that, 
where hospitals are maintained and medical and 
surgical services and medicines furnished by the 
employer from payments by, or assessments on, his 
employees, such payments or assessments shall be 
no more or greater than necessary to make such 
hospital benefits and accommodations, including 
surgical and medical services and medicines, self-
supporting for the care and treatment of his emplo-
yees, and that all sums received or retained by the 
employer from the employees for such purpose shall 
be paid and applied thereto, and provided further, 
that such hospitals so maintained in whole or in 
part by payments or assessment of employees shall 
be subject to the inspection and supervision of the 
commission as to services and treatment rendered 
such employees tm 
35-1-46. Employers to secure compensation - Ways 
allowed - Failure - Notice • Injunction - Violation • 
Penalty. 
Employers including counties, cities, towns and 
school districts shall secure compensation to their 
employees m one of the following ways: 
(1) By insuring, and keeping insured, the payment 
of such compensation with the state insurance fund, 
which payments shall commence within 90 days of 
any final award of the commission. *& 
(2) By insuring, and keeping insured, the payment 
of such compensation with any stock corporation ox 
mutual association authorized to transact the 
business of workmen's compensation insurance in 
this state, which payments shall commence within 
90 days of any final award by the commission. 
(3) By furnishing annually to the commission sat-
isfactory proof of financial ability to pay direct 
compensation in the amount, in the manner and 
when due as provided for in this title, which 
payments shall commence within 90 days of any 
final award by the commission. In such cases the 
commission may in its discretion require the deposit 
of acceptable security, indemnity or bond to secure 
the payment of compensation liabilities as they are 
incurred, and may at any time change or modify its 
findings of fact herein provided for, if in its 
judgment such action is necessary or desirable to 
secure or assure a strict compliance with all the 
provisions of law relating to the payment of comp-
ensation and the furnishing of medical, nurse and 
hospital services, medicines and burial expenses to 
injured, and to the dependents of killed employees. 
The commission may in proper cases revoke any 
employer's privilege as a self-insurer. 
The commission is hereby authorized and 
empowered to maintain a suit in any court of the 
state to enjoin any employer, within the provisions 
of this act, from further operation of the employe-
r's business, where the employer has failed to insure 
or to keep insured in one of the three ways in this 
section provided, the payment of compensation to 
injured employees, and upon a showing of such 
failure to insure the court shall enjoin the further 
operation of such business until such time as such 
insurance has been obtained by the employer. The 
court may enjoin the employer without requiring 
bond from the commission. 
If the commission has reason to believe that an 
employer of one or more employees is conducting a 
business without securing the payment of compens-
ation in one of the three ways provided in this 
section, the commission may give such employer 
five days' written notice by registered mail of such 
noncompliance and if the employer within said 
period does not remedy such default, the commiss-
ion may file suit as in this section above provided 
and the court is empowered, ex parte to issue 
without bond a temporary injunction restraining the 
further operation of the employer's business. 
Any employer who shall fail to comply with the 
provisions of section 35-1-46 shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor and upon complaint of the commiss-
ion and conviction thereof shall be punished by a 
fine of not less than $10 nor more than $100 or by 
imprisonment in the county jail for not less than 
thirty days nor more than six months or by both 
such fine and imprisonment. Each day's failure 
shall be a separate offense All funds so collected 
shall be deposited in the special fund as described in 
section 35-1-68 and used for the purposes in this 
title provided. \m 
35-1-56. Compliance with act - Notice to employe-
es. 
Each employer providing insurance, or electing 
directly to pay compensation to his injured, or the 
dependents of his killed employees, as herein 
provided, shall post in conspicuous places about his 
place of business typewritten or printed notices 
stating, that he has complied with the provisions of 
this title and all the rules and regulations of the 
commission made in pursuance thereof, and if such 
is the case, that he has been authorized by the 
commission directly to compensate such employees 
or dependents; and the same, when so posted, shall 
constitute sufficient notice to his employees of the 
fact that he has complied with the law as to 
securing compensation to his employees and their 
dependents. t*17 
35-1-57. Noncompliance - Penalty. 
Employers who shall fail to comply with the pro-
visions of section 35-1-46 shall not be entitled to 
the benefits of this title during the period of nonc-
ompliance, but shall be liable in a civil action to 
their employees for damages suffered by reason of 
personal injuries arising out of or in the course of 
employment caused by the wrongful act, neglect or 
default of the employer or any of the employer's 
officers, agents or employees, and also to the depe-
ndents or personal representatives of such 
employees where death results from such injuries. ID 
any such action the defendant shall not avail 
himself of any of the following defenses: the 
defense of the fellow-servant rule, the defense of 
assumption of risk, or the defense of contributory 
negligence. Proof of the injury shall constitute 
prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of 
the employer and the burden shall be upon the 
employer tc show freedom from negligence resulting 
in such injury. And such employers shall also be 
subject to the provisions of the two sections next 
succeeding [35-1-58, 35-1-59]. In any civil action 
permitted under this section against the employer 
the employee shall be entitled to necessary costs and 
a reasonable attorney fee assessed against the 
employer. i*# 
to comply. 
Any employee, whose employer has failed to 
comply with the provisions of section 35-1-46, who 
has been injured by accident arising out of or in the 
course of his employment, wheresoever" such injury 
occurred, if the same was not purposely self-inflicted 
, or his dependents in case death has ensued, may, 
in lieu of proceeding against his employer by civil 
action in the courts as provided in the last preceding 
section [35-1-57], file his application with the 
commission for compensation in accordance with 
the terms of this title, and the commission shall 
hear and determine such application for compensa-
tion as in other cases; and the amount of compens-
ation which the commission may ascertain and 
determine to be due to such injured employee, or 
his dependents in case death has ensued, shall be 
paid by such employer to the persons entitled 
thereto within ten days after receiving notice of the 
amount thereof as so fixed and determined by the 
commission. I*SJ 
35-1-59. Docketing awards in district court -
Enforcing judgment. 
An abstract of any award may be filed in the 
office of the clerk of the district court of any 
county in the state, and must be docketed in the 
judgment docket of the district court thereof. The 
time of the receipt of the abstract must be noted by 
him thereon and entered in the docket. When so 
filed and docketed the award shall constitute a lien 
from the time of such docketing upon the real 
property of the employer situated in the county, for 
a period of eight years from the date of the award 
unless previously satisfied. Execution maybe issued 
thereon within the same time and in the same 
manner and with the same effect as if said award 
were a judgment of the district court. 
In cases where the employer was uninsured at the 
time of the injury, the county attorney for the 
county in which the applicant or the employer 
resides, depending on the district in which the final 
award is docketed, shall enforce the judgment when 
requested by the industrial commission. Where the 
action to enforce a judgment is initiated by other 
counsel, reasonable attorney's fees and court costs 
shall be allowed in addition to the award. im 
35*1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or 
officer, agent or employee • Occupational disease 
excepted. 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to 
the provisions of this title for injuries sustained by 
an employee, whether resulting in death or not, 
shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer 
and shall be the exclusive remedy against any 
officer, agent or employee of the employer and the 
liabilities of the employer imposed by this act shall 
be in place of any arid all other civil liability whats-
oever, at common law or otherwise, to such 
employee or to his spouse, widow, children, 
parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal 
representatives, guardian, or any other person 
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury 
or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggrav-
ated or incurred by such employee in the course of 
or because of or arising out of his employment, and 
no action at law may be maintained against an 
employer or against any officer, agent or employee 
of the employer based upon any accident, injury or 
death of an employee. Nothing in this section, 
however, shall prevent an employee (or his depend-
ents) from filing a claim with the industrial commi-
ssion of Utah for compensation in those cases 
within the provision of the Utah Occupational 
Disease Disability Act, as amended. mi 
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to 
modify award - Authority to destroy records -
Interest on award. 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission 
over each case shall be continuing, and it may from 
time to time make such modification or change with 
respect to former findings, or orders with respect 
thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, provided, 
however, that records pertaining to cases, other 
than those of total permanent disability or where a 
claim has been filed as in 35-1-99, which have been 
closed and inactive for a period of 10 years, may be 
destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
Awards made by the industrial commission shall 
include interest at the rate of 8^G per annum from 
the date when each benefit payment would have 
otherwise become due and payable. lfti 
35-1-8S. Rules of evidence and procedure before 
commission and hearing examiner - Admissible 
evidence. 
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner 
shall be bound by the usual common-law or 
statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or 
formal rules of procedure, other than as herein 
provided or as adopted by the commission pursuant 
to this act. The commission may make its investiga-
tion in such manner as in its judgment is best calc-
ulated to ascertain the substantial rights of the 
parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The commission may receive as evidence and use 
as proof of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed 
material and relevant including, but not limited to 
the following: 
(a) Deposit ions and sworn test imony presented in 
o p e n hearings. 
(b) Reports o f attending or examining physicians, 
or o f pathologists . 
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the 
commiss ion . 
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of time 
sheets, book accounts or other records. 
(c) Hospital records in the case of an injured or 
diseased employee. W6S 
35-1-107. Default Indemnity Fund - Creation • 
Liability • Funding • Administration • Subrogat ion. 
(1) There is created a Default Indemnity Fund for 
the purpose o f paying and assuring, to persons 
entitled t o , workers1 compensat ion benefits when an 
employer becomes insolvent, appoints or has 
appointed a receiver, or otherwise dots not have 
sufficient funds , insurance, sureties, or other 
security to cover workers' compensat ion liabilities 
under this chapter. If it becomes necessary to pay 
benefits, the fund will be liable for all obl igations 
o f the employer as set forth in Chapters 1 and 2 , 
Title 35 . 
(2) Funds for the Default Indemnity Fund are to 
be provided pursuant to Subsection 35-l-68(2)(a). 
The state treasurer snail be the custodian of the 
Default Indemnity Fund and the commission shall 
direct its distribution. Reasonable costs of adminis-
tration may be paid from the fund. The attorney 
general shall appoint a member of his staff to 
represent the Default Indemnity Fund in all procee-
dings brought to enforce claims against or on behalf 
of the fund. . , 
(3) To the extent of the compensation and other 
benefits paid or payable to an employee or their 
dependents from the Default Indemnity Fund, the 
fund, by subrogation, has all the rights, powers, 
and benefits of the employee or their dependents 
against the employer failing to make the compensa-
tion payments. 
(4) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory 
successor o f an insolvent employer shall be bound 
by settlements o f covered -claims by the fund. The 
court having jurisdiction shall grant all payments 
made under this section a priority equal to that to 
which the claimant would have been entitled in the 
absence o f this section against the assets o f the 
insolvent employer. The expenses o f the fund in 
handling claims shall be accorded the same priority 
as the liquidator's expenses. 
(5) The commission shall periodically file with the 
receiver, trustee, or liquidator of the insolvent 
employer or insurance carrier statements of the 
covered claims paid by the fund and estimates of 
anticipated claims against the fund which shall 
preserve the rights of the fund for claims against 
the assets of the insolvent employer. 
(6) When any injury or death for which compen-
sation is payable from the Default Indemnity Fund 
has been caused by the wrongful act or neglect o f 
another person not in the same employment , the 
fund has the same rights as allowed under Section 
35-1-62. 
(7) The fund, subject to approval o f the Workers' 
Compensation Division of the Industrial Commiss i -
o n , shall discharge its obligations by adjusting its 
own claims or contracting with an adjusting 
company, risk management company, insurance 
company, or other company that has expertise and 
capabilities in adjusting and paying worker's c o m p -
ensation claims. 
(8) For the purpose o f maintaining this fund, the 
commission, upon rendering a decision with respect 
to any claim from the Default Indemnity Fund for 
compensation under this chapter, shall impose a 
penalty against the employer o f l5^o of the total 
award made in the claim and shall direct that the 
additional penalty be paid into the fund. Awards 
may be docketed as other awards under this 
chapter. 
(9) The liability o f the state, the Industrial C o m -
mission, and the state treasurer, with respect to 
payment o f any compensation benefits, expenses, 
fees, or disbursement properly chargeable against 
the fund, is limited to the assets in the fund, and 
they are not otherwise in any way liable for the 
making of any payment. 
(10) The commiss ion may make reasonable rules 
for the processing and payment o f claims for c o m -
pensation out of the fund. ift4 
Rule 60. Relief from Judgment or Order 
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders 
or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from over-
sight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its 
own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, 
if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, 
such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed 
in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court 
